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In the

Supreme Court of the State of Utah
THOMAS B. MOONEY,
Plaintiff and Respondent, .
vs.

Case No.
7373

THE DENVER AND RIO GRANDE
WESTERN RAILROAD COMPANY,
a corporation,
Defendant and Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
STATEMENT OF FACTS
A prior appeal in this case taken by the plaintiff from
an order dismissing the action, pursuant to a motion of the
defendant based upon the grounds of forum non conveniens
was disposed of in an opinion reported in 221 P. 2d 628.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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This Court held that the courts of this State are not
required by any statutory or constitutional mandate to entertain suits of non-residents based upon an alleged violation of the Federal Employers' Liability Act occuring outside this State, but concluded that the lower court abused its
discretion in dismissing the action under the circumstances
revealed by the evidence then in the record. The order of
dismissal was vacated and the cause remanded with directions to permit both parties to present evidence in support
of or in opposition to the motion (221 P. 2d at 649). Pursuant to this direction, the defendant renewed its motion
to dismiss, supporting the same by an affidavit of one of
its attorneys (R. 17-25). One of plaintiff's attorneys filed
on his behalf an affidavit in opposition to the defendant's
motion to dismiss (R. 27). This affidavit admitted parts
and denied parts of the affidavit of defendant's attorney
(R. 27-29). Upon the hearing of defendant's renewed motion to dismiss, it introduced evidence in support of the
motion (R. 36-37). The plaintiff offered no evidence in
opposition <R. 57). The trial court denied the motion (R.
34). No findings of fact, conclusions of law, or judgment
·other than the minute entry of the order was made or entered.
Plaintiff, a brakeman on a work train, was injured on
January 5, 1949, when he fell from a car described in the
pleadings and evidence as a Jordan Spreader car, which
was standing on a side track in the defendant's yard at
Tabernash, Colorado (R. 219-220). The Jordan Spreader
car may be briefly described as a snow plow (R. 219). It
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consists of flanges with attachments to operate the same,
all of which are mounted on an ordinary railroad flat car
(R. 219) (Exhibit C). It is used to remove snow from
the railroad tracks and also to spread ballast on the road
bed. It is equipped with a hand brake (Exhibit C).
The brake on the Spreader consists of a perpendicular
shaft extending above and below the top surface of the
car at the end thereof and over toward one side. Underneath the car the shaft or staff is connected with a mechanism by which, when the shaft is rotated, it tightens or
releases the brake shoes. Attached to the top of the shaft
is a wheel which is turned in applying or releasing the
brake. Attached to the shaft at the top surface of the car
is a ratchet, the rotation of which is controlled by a pawl.
When the wheel is turned to apply the brake, the pawl
engages the ratchet and holds the brake in a fixed position
until released. The brake shoes may also be set by air (R.
254-255) (Exhibit C). In order to release the brake after
the air has been let out, it is necessary to tighten it enough
to release the tension on the pawl. The latter may then be
disengaged from the ratchet by kicking it or by hand. According to the testimony of the plaintiff, the pawl was
covered with ice, and frozen in the ratchet (R. 258). He
picked up a brake shoe and pounded on the pawl to jar it
loose from the ice. He says he then tightened the brake and
disengaged the pawl. According to the plaintiff's version,
the brake shaft was bent, and when he released the pawl,
the shaft whirled and threw him from the car (R. 258-259).
The present appeal is from the judgment in favor of
plaintiff entered upon a jury verdict.
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STATEMENT OF POINTS RELIED ON
POINT I.
THE COURT ERRED IN INSTRUCTING THE
JURY UPON ISSUES NOT WITHIN THE
PLEADINGS OR SUPPORTED BY EVIDENCE.
POINT II.
THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO INSTRUCT THE JURY WITH RESPECT TO THE
PLAINTIFF'S CONDUCT BEING THE SOLE
CAUSE OF THE ACCIDENT AND INJURY.
POINT III.
THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO INSTRUCT THE JURY THAT NO PRESUMPTION OF LIABILITY ARISES OUT OF THE
FACT OF INJURY AND THAT PLAINTIFF
MUST PROVE NEGLIGENCE TO RECOVER
UNDER THE FEDERAL EMPLOYERS' LIABILITY AGT.
POINT IV.
THE COURT ERRED IN DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS UPON THE
GROUND OF FORUM NON CONVENIENS.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE COURT ERRED IN INSTRUCTING THE
JURY UPON ISSUES NOT WITHIN THE
PLEADINGS OR SUPPORTED BY EVIDENCE.
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The original complaint predicated liability upon a
violation of the Safety Appliance Act, Title 45, Section
11, U. S. C. A., which provides "it shall be unlawful for
any common carrier subject to the provisions of Section
1-16 of this title to haul or permit to be hauled or used on
its line, any car subject to the provisions of said sections
not equipped with appliances provided for in Section 16
of this Title, to wit: All cars m~st be equipped with secure sill steps and efficient hand brakes." It was alleged
that the hand brake on the Jordan Spreader car was inefficient, dangerous and unsafe in that it was likely to
release unexpectedly, that the staff was sprung and bent
(R. 1-5). On the opening of the trial, plaintiff was permitted to file an amendment to his complaint by adding
to Paragraph VI of the complaint two additional subparagraphs (D) and (E). Paragraph VI of the complaint alleged that the defendant was careless, reckless, and negligent and acted in violation of the Federal Safety Appliance Act in the particulars set forth in the subparagraphs
A, B, and C, which as above indicated, related solely to
the inefficiency of the brake. Subparagraph D of the
amendment to the complaint alleged simply that the defendant, in violation of the Safety Appliance Act, used a
Jordan Spreader car equipped with an inefficient, dangerous, and unsafe hand brake in this: that the area upon the
car around the brake did not provide a safe and adequate
place for a workman to station himself while manipulating
the hand brake. Subparagraph E of the Amendment to
the complaint alleged that the defendant failed to furnish
plaintiff a reasonable safe place wherein and whereon to
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do and perform the ordinary duties of his employment in
that the defendant requi:tzed the plaintiff to release the
hand brake on the Jordan Spreader car at a time when the
area upon said car around said ·brake did not provide a
safe and adequate place to position himself while manipulating said hand brake (R. 76-77).
The court submitted to the jury the issue of liability
under the Safety Appliance Act and in that connection instructed them that if they determined that the plaintiff
had proved a violation of this act and that such violation
contributed to the plaintiff's injuries, they could not make
any deduction from the plaintiff's damages by reason of his
contributory negligence if any.
Trial court also submitted to the jury an issue of negligence under the Federal Employers' Liability Act and in
that connection instructed the jury that if they found such
negligence to exist and if it contributed to the plaintiff's
injuries, they could diminish the plaintiff's damages in
proportion to the contributory negligence if any of the
plaintiff. The jury, by its verdict, did diminish the plaintiff's damage because of the contributory negligence of the
plaintiff (R. 141). The legal effect therefore of the jury's
verdict is that it has absolved the defendant from any
liability predicated upon the alleged vioLation of the Safety
Appliance Act. It is legally equivalent to a finding by the
jury that the hand brake on the Jordan Spreader was not
an inefficient hand brake and that its staff was not sprung
or bent.
The issue of negligence was submitted to the jury in
Instruction No. Six, which reads as follows :
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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"You are instructed that under the provisions of
the Federal Employers' Liability Act applicable to
this case the law imposes the duty upon the defendant company to exercise reasonable care to provide
its employees with a reasonably safe place to work.
This duty does not require the absolute elimination
of all danger, but it does require the elimination of
all dangers which the exercise of reasonable care by
the railroad company could remove or guard against.
"In this connection I instruct you, therefore,
that if you shall find from a preponderance of the
evidence that the deck of the Jordan Spreader surrounding the brake staff had tools, chains, or other
objects thereon which required plaintiff to stand in
a place from which he could not operate the hand
brake in reasonable safety, then and in that event
you may consider such facts, if any, in ascertaining
whether or not the defendant company is negligent
under the terms of the Federal Employers' Liability
Act. And if you further find from a preponderance
of the evidence that such negligence, if any, proximately caused, in whole or in part, injuries to plaintiff, then you should return a verdict in favor of the
plaintiff and against the defendant and award plaintiff damages as in these instructions set forth."

It is the contention of the defendant that the trial
court committed prejudicial error in so instructing the
jury, for the reason first that there is no evidence to support a finding by the jury that the defendant was negligent in failing to move from the deck of the Jordan
Spread "tools, chains, or other objects thereon," or that
any failure to remove from the deck of the spreader any
tools, chains, or other objects thereon caused either in whole
or in part the accident or injury of which the plaintiff
complains.
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The only evidence in this record concerning the existence of any "tools, chains, or othe·r objects" on the deck
of the spreader is to be found in the testimony of the plaintiff. He testified that he was standing on the east side of
the spreader when the conductor directed him to release
the brakes; that he climbed over the coupling to the west
side of the spreader and mounted the car from that side;
(R. 254) that he went over to that side because there was
a tool box "and other stuff, chain and things like that"
on the east side of the spreader and he thought it was safer
to get on the car from the west side ( R. 254 and 304 and
309) . When asked about the condition of the floor of the
car at the place of the brake staf;f, he stated, "Well, behind
me was a grab iron and there was very little room to stand
and there was stuff scattered all over there. Tools had
been thrown on there after we had done some work with
the spreader at Granby. We had a little trouble with the
flanges sticking out and the tools were taken off and
thrown back on again." He then identified Exhibit "C" as
an accurate photograph of the Jordan Spreader taken a
few days before the trial. When asked if there was any
difference between the corner where the brake is located
and the area of the deck of the car as shown in Exhibit
"C" and at the time of the accident, plaintiff stated that
Exhibit "C" did not show the tool box. The brake staff
was located six inches from the south end of the car, twenty
inches from the center and sixteen inches from the side of
the car (R. 309).
On cross examination, plaintiff stated:
"Q. Isn't it a fact when you climbed up on the
west side of the car you climbed up there because
this side was cleaned off?
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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"A. It had been tramped down by getting up
and down off that side.
"Q. And comparatively speaking, it was
cleaned off?
"A. It wasn't cleaned off. Men had been
climbing up and working and had tromped it down.
"Q. But there weren't tools and equipment on
that side?
"A. No, sir. There was a chain lying somewhere there and a brake shoe somewhere in the
vicinity.
"Q. That didn't in anyway interfere with you
up there.
"A. No, not for my foot space (R. 309). * * *
"Q. So that I take it, after you had climbed
up in this position with your feet in approximately
the position indicated on that drawing, that you
then braced your feet. Did you not?
"A. Yes, sir.
"Q. And you had a firm stance on the deck of
the car in that position?
"A. Well, I had hold of the wheel to help me
make my feet firm.
"Q. The rules require you to get a firm stance,
don't they, before you operate a brake?
"A. In this particular instance it was very
hard to really pick out a good place that was good
and firm and safe.
"Q. You did get a firm stance on the deck of
the car, didn't you ?
"A. I got the best I could get for the conditions.
"Q. Well, there wasn't anything about the way
you were standing that in anyway contributed to
your accident was there?
"A. No, sir" (R. 311-312).
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The staff of the brake was about three feet above the
floor of the car and the wheel by me,ans of which the brake
is released would strike a workman of average height about
at the waist (R. 310).
We submit that this evidence fails completely to establish any negligence on the part of the defendant in failing to remove from the deck of the spreader any tools,
chains, or other objects. It will be noted that the Jordan
Spreader car was an ordinary flat car, and, therefore, does
not have any brake platform or deck. The brake mechanism is simply attached to the floor of the car. It is also
to be kept in mind that the Jordan Spreader car was a snow
plow used to clear the tracks of snow. It was a part of a
work train and not a car used in the transportation of
freight. The presence of tools, chains, or other objects on
the floor- of such a piece of equipment is perfectly normal,
natural, and to be expected. Any failure to remove such
objects from the floor of the car prior to directing a workman to release the brake could not within the realm of
reason be determined a breach of the duty to provide the
brakeman a safe place in which to perform his duties.
Furthermore, as the evidence demonstrates, any "chains,
tools, or other objects" that may have been on the floor of
the Jordan Spreader car did not in any manner interfere
with the plaintiff's operations in releasing the brake. He
did not stumble over, slip on, or stand on any "chain, tool,
or other object" while releasing or attem·pting to release
the brake. There was ample space between the tool box
which was on the floor of the spreader and the brake
ratchet for the plaintiff to stand while releasing the brake.
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He did stand in that position and did release the brake
without coming in contact in anyway with any "chain, tool,
or other object" that may have been on the floor of the
spreader. There is not the remotest causal connection
between the accident sustained by the plaintiff and
the presence of any "tools, chains, or other objects"
that may have been "lying around" on the car. The condition of the floor of the car neither caused or contributed
in the slightest degree to the fall of the plaintiff from the
car. He testified positively and unequivocally that he was.
thrown from the car by the whirling of the brake staff
following his disengaging the pawl. His description of the
accident removes even the remotest possibility that the condition of the floor of the car contributed in the slightest
degree to the fall from the car. We quote from his testimony.
"Q. Did you release the brake on the spreader
on this occasion?
''A. Yes, sir.
"Q. Tell us what happened.
"A. I climbed there and there was snow and
ice froze all over the deck of the car and it had been
quite cold the night before, around 20 below, and I
seen a brake shoe lying there and I thought if I
would pound on the dog or jar it it would knock the
ice off a little, and I wouldn't have that to contend
with when I was releasing it. I did that, and I proceeded to release the brake in the normal manner
by pulling and straining on the brake to get the dog
out. I had my foot against the dog. It had to come
out just a very little to free the brake, and I was
pulling as hard as I could against it and pushing
with my foot against the dog and when it released
it threw me off.
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"Q. What was it that threw you off?
"A. The brake staff was bent and when it
came around it came around with a whirl and threw
me backward. Otherwise it would come around
straight up and down, but being bent it had a tendency to unwind (R. 258). * * *
"Q. What was the next thing you knew after
you were whirled off?
"A. I came to on the ground" (R. 259).

Plaintiff did not qualify, add to, or deduct from the
foregoing version of the manner in which he sustained his
injury. Nothing is more clearly established in this case
than the fact that plaintiff was thrown from the car by
the spinning of the brake wheel or the whirling of the staff,
and that the presence of any chains, tools, or other objects
on the floor of the car was merely a static condition which
played no part in the accident in which the plaintiff sustained his injury. Numerous authorities sustained these
conclusions.
See:

Brady v. Southern Ry. Co., 64 S. Ct. 232, 320

u. s.

476;

Reynolds v. Atlantic Coast R. R. Co., 69 S. Ct.
507, 336

u. s.

207;

Kenney v. Boston & Maine R. R., 33 Atl. 2d
557, 92 N. H. 495;

Central Vermont Railway Company v. Perry,
10 F. 2d 132 (1st Cir.) ;
Dade v. Boston & Maine R. R., 30 Atl. 2d 485,
92 N. H. 294;

Lowden v. Bowen, 183 P. 2d 980, (Okl.) ;
Tremelling v. Southern Pacific Company, 170
Pac. 80, 51 Utah 189;

Ehalt v. McCarthy, et al., 138 P. 2d 639, 104
Utah 110.
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In Brady v. Southern Railway Company, supra, the
deceased was fatally injured when thrown from a car in a
moving train. The car was derailed when it ran over "the
wrong" end of a derailer. One of the grounds of negligence
alleged was that the rail opposite the derailer was weak
and defective, being worn on top and on the side. Plaintiff
claimed that if this rail had been without defect the car
would have gone over the derailer and stayed on the tracks.
The Supreme Court of the United States held that although
there was sufficient evidence of a defect in the rail, such
defect was not negligence causing in whole or in part the
fatal injuries. We quote from the opinion:
"The Supreme Court of North Carolina (222 N.
C. at page 370, 23 S. E. 2d at page 338) was of the
view that striking a derailer from the unexpected
direction 'was so unusual, so contrary to the purpose'
of the derailer that provision to guard against such
a happening was beyond the requirement of due
care. With this we agree. Bare possibility is not
sufficient. Milwaukee, etc., R. Co. v. Kellogg, 94 U.
S. 469, at page 475, 24 L. Ed. 256; 'But it is generally held, that, in order to warrant a finding that
negligence, or an act not amounting to wanton
wrong, is the proximAte cause of an injury it must
appear that the injury was the natural and probable
consequence of the negligence or wrongful act, and
that it ought to have been foreseen in the light of
the attending circumstances.' Events too remote to
require reasonable provision need not be anticipated.
* * *"
The case of Reynolds v. Atlantic Coast R. Company,
69 S. Ct. 507, 336 U. S. 207, is directly in point upon the

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

14
proposition that there is no causal connection between the
condition of the floor of the car and the injury sustained
by the plaintiff. In that case, a brakeman fell between the
sixth and the seventh cars of a moving train. He was proceeding from the caboose to the seventh car in order to pass
a signal. The complaint alleged that the railroad was negligent in allowing canes to grow alongside the roadbed and
in failing to provide an additional brakeman. It was claimed
that if the canes had been removed from the side of the
roadbed the deceased could have given the signal from the
sixth car and further, that if an additional brakeman had
been provided, the deceased would not have had to give a
signal from the moving cars. The Supreme Court of the
United States conceded that the railroad might properly
have been held guilty of negligence under the Federal Employers' Liability Act in failing to remove the canes from
alongside the tracks and in failing to provide an additional
brakeman, but held that there was no causal connection be. tween such negligence and the fall of the brakeman between
the moving cars.
Having demonstrated the total absence of any causal
connection between the presence of any tools, chains, or
other objects on the floor of the Jordan Spreader and the
fall of the plaintiff from that car, it necessarily follows
that the court committed prejudicial error in instructing
the jury that if such negligence proximately caused in
whole or in part the injuries to the plaintiff, it should
return a verdict in favor· of the plaintiff.
In the case of King v. The Denver and Rio Grande
Western Railroad Company, 211 P. 2d 833, . . Utah .. ,
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the deceased was killed when a car which he was riding
ran over a trestle. The court permitted the jury to determine that if the brake on the car was not an efficient hand
brake within the meaning of the Safety Appliance Act, the
plaintiff could recover. There was no evidence in the case
tending to show that the brake was defective or inefficient.
This Court reversed the judgment of the lower court because it had permitted the plaintiff to recover upon a basis
unsupported by the evidence. See also, Fowkes v. J. I. Case
Threshing l'tfach. Co., 46 Utah 502, 151 Pac. 53; KendaU
v. Fordham, 79 Utah 256, 9 P. 2d 183; Industrial Comm.
v. Wasatch. Grading Co., 80 Utah 223, 14 P. 2d 988; Peterson v. Sorenson, 91 Utah 507, 65 P. 2d 12.
POINT II.
THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO INSTRUCT THE JURY WITH RESPECT TO THE
PLAINTIFF'S CONDUCT BEING THE SOLE
CAUSE OF THE ACCIDENT AND INJURY.
Defendant requested the court to instruct the jury that
if they believed from the evidence that the sole cause of.
the accident and injury sustained by the plaintiff was his
failure to use a brake club properly to release the brake,
their verdict must be in favor of the defendant. (Defendant's requested Instruction No. 6.)
The plaintiff had been instructed by the conductor
in c·harge of the train crew ·to use a brake club to release the brake on the Jordan Spreader (R. 472). The
plaintiff disobeyed this instruction. Even if this inSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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struction had not been given to the plaintiff, the simplest degree of ordinary prudence would have dictated
that plaintiff use a brake club to release this brake. The
Jordan Spreader was standing on a grade track. The weather was extremely cold and undoubtedly the rails were
slippery. In view of these conditions, the brake on the
Jordan Spreader had been set very tight. The plaintiff was
familiar with all of these conditions and circumstances.
Nevertheless, he undertook to release the brake without any
implement by which he could regulate the tension of the
brake. Instead he used a brake shoe to pound loose the pawl
and having only his hands to control the tension after the
pawl had been disengaged. Had he used a brake club in
releasing the brake, he could have readily and easily prevented the staff from spinning and whirling (R. 433). In
short, he could have avoided the accident and injury by
obeying the instruction of his superior, or following the dictates of the most elementary prudence. In this state of the
evidence, well settled principles of law entitled the defendant to have the jury instructed that if they found that the
sole cause of the accident and injury was the plaintiff's
failure to use a brake club to release the brake, their verdict
must be in favor of the defendant.
A case directly in point is Hen wood v. Coburn, 165 F.
2d 418. In this case Coburn, the conductor in charge of a
freight train, was fatally injured when the caboose in
which he was riding was struck by a passenger train. It
was Coburn's duty to require the flagman to set a warning
signal to the passenger train of the location of the caboose.
There was evidence from which the jury could have de-

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

17
termined that Coburn failed to see to it that the flagman
put out the proper signals, and that the passenger train
ran into the caboose because of the absence of such warning. The action to recover damages for his death was
predicated upon the Federal Employers' Liability Act, and
the defendant railroad requested an instruction as follows:
"And you are also instructed that even if you
should find and believe from the evidence that the
flagman left the caboose in time to flag the passenger train, still if you further find that he returned
to the caboose at a time when there was danger of
a collision between the passenger train and freight
train number 681, and if you find that conductor
Coburn permitted him to return to the caboose and
to remain in the caboose under such circumstances,
and if you find that conductor Coburn was negligent in so permitting the flagman to return to the
caboose and to remain in it, and that such negligence
was the sole cause of the collision between the two
trains, then you are instructed that the plaintiff is
not entitled to recover and your verdict must be
for the defendant."
This request was refused although the court did instruct
as follows:
"In order for this defense to prevail, you will
be required to find from the evidence that there
was no other negligence on the part of the defendand or any of its officers, employees, or agents that
proximately caused the collision in question and
that the plaintiff's intestate was guilty of the sole
and only negligence that caused the collision."
The Circuit Court of Appeals held that inasmuch as
there was evidence from which the jury could determine
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that Coburn was negligent and that such negligence was
the sole cause of the collision, the trial court committed
prejudicial error in refusing to submit such defense to the
jury, and that the instruction given did n<~t adequately
present the defendant's defense :
"The point we are trying to make is that the
considerations which presumably prompted the trial
court to refuse to give the trustee's requested instruction No. 2 were not questions which the court
had a right to resolve in favor of the administratrix
as a matter of law in deciding whether the requested
instruction should be given or refused. As we have
pointed out, under the teaching of the recent decisions of the Supreme Court, the domain of the jury
in circumstantial cases under the Federal Employers'
Lia;bility Act may not be narrowly bounded, and the
settling of any question of negligence or proximate
cause, where more than one rational possibility is
involved on the evidentiary facts, is exclusively within its field. This is true for every purpose in the
case, and, in according the jury its inherent function, recognition of the right in one aspect or incident of a case is as important as in another
* * · * As a matter of legal test, a jury in the
latitude which is open to it might legitimately infer
from the facts that, if Coburn knew that Story had
returned to the caboose and failed to send him back
out (which the witnesses on both sides agreed that
a conductor should do in such a situation), this
neglect of duty could have constituted the sole efficient cause of Coburn's death, if the jury should
be of the view that on the Gircumstances which we
have set out neither Story nor the engineer of the
passenger train ought to be regarded as having been
negligent. The trustee was therefore, we think,
entitled to have had this theory submitted to the
jury, as he sought to have done by his requested in-
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struction No. 2. What we recently said in another
case may be repeated, that, 'as against a mere general or abstract charge, a party is entitled to a
specific instruction on his theory of the case, if there
is evidence to support it and if a proper request for
such an instruction is made.' Chicago & N. W. Ry.
Co. v. Green, 8 Cir., 164 F. 2d 55, 61. The requested
instruction here was in no way legally incorrect but,
if the trial court desired to amplify or clarify it in
any way, it of course was at liberty to do so."
This court has repeatedly announced that a party toa lawsuit is entitled to have the jury pass upon his theory
of the case when there is evidence to sustain it. See Pratt
v. Utah Light and Traction Company, 57 Utah 7, 169 P.
863; Webb v. Snow, 102 Utah 435, 132 P. 2d 144; State v.
Newton, 105 Utah 561, 144 P. 2d 290. The proposition is
stated succinctly in the Pratt case as follows:
"Each party to a suit is entitled to have his
theory, when there is evidence to support it, submitted to the jury and the judgment of the jury on
the facts tending to support such theory assuming
always that there is testimony offered to support
the same."
The issue embodied in the defendant's request was a
controlling issue in the case, and the refusal of the court
to submit it deprived the defendant of its right to have its
principal defense passed upon by the jury. See Wilson v.
Union Pacific Railroad Company, 231 P. 2d 715, ... Utah
POINT III.
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TION OF LIABILITY ARISES OUT OF THE
FACT OF INJURY AND THAT PLAINTIFF
MUST PROVE NEGLIGENCE TO RECOVER
UNDER THE FEDERAL EMPLOYERS' LIABILITY ACT.
In its Instruction No. 11, the defendant requested the
court to instruct the jury that the defendant is not an
insurer of the safety of any employees and is not liable to
respond in damages merely because the plaintiff was injured while engaged in the performance of his work as a
brakeman ; that there is no presumption that the defendant
was negligent or that it violated the Safety Appliance Act,
or that such. negligence or violation on its part, even if
established, was the proximate cause of the accident and
injury to the plaintiff, and that negligence, if any, and
violation of the act, if any, and whether such negligence or
violation, if any, was the proximate cause of the accident
and injury must be proved by the plaintiff by a preponderance of the evidence.
We submit that this request embodied correct principles of law applicable to the evidence in the case and that
the refusal to give it deprived the defendant of a fair trial.
In denying defendant's request, the trial court apparently
was under the impression that the Supreme Court of the
United States has by its recent decisions abandoned its
previously announced conceptions of the law of negligence
under the Federal Employers' Liability Act. Such an impression is entirely erroneous. That court has repeatedly
declared that railroad companies are not insurers of the
safety of their employees, that no presumption of liability
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arises out of the fact that an employee is injured while
acting in the course of his employment, and that proof of
negligence causing the injury is a condition precedent to
liability. See Moore v. Chesapeake and Ohio Railroad Company, 340 U. S. 573, 71 S. Ct. 428; Tennant v. Peoria, etc.,
321 U.S. 29, 64 S. Ct. 409, 88 L. Ed. 520; Brady v. Southern
Railway Company, 320 U. S. 476, 64 S. Ct. 232; 88 L. Ed.
239; Coray v. Southern Pacific Company, 335 U. S. 520; 69
S. Ct. 275; Wilkerson v. McCarthy, 336 U. S. 53, 69 S. Ct.
413, 93 L. Ed. 497.
In the Wilkerson case, Mr. Justice Black delivering
the opinion of the court said:
"Much of the respondents' argument here is
devoted to the proposition that the Federal Act does
not make the railroad an absolute insurer against
personal injury damages suffered by· its employees.
That proposition is correct, since the Act imposes
liability only for negligent injuries. Cf. Coray v.
Southern Pac. Co., 335 U. S. 520, 69 S. Ct. 275.

* * * "

"There are some who think that recent decisions
of this Court which have required submission of
negligence questions to a jury make, 'for all practical purposes, a railroad ~n insurer of its employees.' See individual opinion of Judge Major,
Griswold v. Gardner, 7 Cir., 155 F. 2d 333, 334. But
see Judge Kerner's dissent from this view 155 F. 2d
333, at page 337 and Judge Lindley's dissenting
opinion 155 F. 2d 333, at pages 337, 338. This assumption, that railroads are made insurers where
the issue of negligence ·is left to the jury, is inadmissible. It rests on another assumption, this one
unarticulated, that juries will invariably decide negligence questions against railroads. This is contrary to fact, as shown for illustration by other
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Federal Employers Liability cases,
(Citing cases.)

* * *

,

Mr. Justice Douglas in a concurring opinion added:
"The Federal Employers' Liability Act was designed to put on the railroad industry some of the
cost for the legs, eyes, arms, and lives which it consumed in its operations. Not all these costs were
imposed, for the Act did not make the employer an
insurer. The liability which it imposed was the
liability for negligence. * * * The basis of liability under the Act is and remains negligence.
* * *"
The latest expression of the Supreme Court that we
are able to find reaffirming the principles embodied in the
requested instruction is set forth, in Moore v. Chesapeake
and Ohio Railway Company, supra, as follows:
"To recover under the Act, it was incumbent
upon petitioner to prove negligence of respondent
which caused the fatal accident. Tennant v. Peoria
& P. U. R. Co., 321 U. S. 29, 32, 64 S. Ct. 409, 411,
88 L. Ed. 520. The negligence she alleged was that
respondent's engineer made a sudden and unexpected stop without warning, 'thereby causing decedent to be thrown from a position of safety on the
rear of the tender' into the path of the train.
* * * The burden was upon petitioner to prove
that decedent fell after the train stopped without
warning, which was the act of negligence she charged. Her evidence showed he fell before the train
stopped. * * *"
Nowhere in its charge to the jury did the court direct
them that the burden rested on the plaintiff to prove
negligence causing the injury, or that they could not prediSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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cate liability upon the mere happening of the accident, or
that the defendant was not an insurer of the safety of its
employees. By refusing and failing to require the jury to
apply these well settled principles of law to the evidence,
the trial court authorized the jury to render a verdict for
the plaintiff without requiring him to meet the conditions
precedent to a recovery under the terms of the Federal
Employers' Liability Act and prevented the defendant from
having its defense to the action submitted to the jury for
its determination.
We need not cite again the numerous decisions of this
court which hold it to be reversible error to refuse to submit to the jury a defense which is raised by the pleadings
and supported by the evidence. We submit that the refusal of the court to instruct the jury as requested in defendant's Instruction No. 11 deprived the defendant of a
fundamental right.

POINT IV.
THE COURT ERRED IN DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS UPON THE
GROUND OF FORUM NON CONVENIENS.
In its opinion vacating the Order of Judge Hendricks
dismissing the action upon the grounds of forum non conveniens, this Court held specifically and unequivocally that
the courts of this State have the power to refuse to hear or
determine the plaintiff's cause of action. The exercise of
that power was held to be the exercise of a sound legal
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discretion. It was determined that the evidence then before Judge Hendricks was not sufficient to warrant a refusal to entertain the action.
It is the contention of the defendant upon the present

appeal tha~ it supplied upon the retrial of its motion all
of the. evidence which this Court determined necessary to
justify a refusal to entertain the suit, and there being no
evidence contradicting, impeaching, or in any other manner
impairing the evidence presented by the defendant, the trial
court did not exercise a sound judicial discretion in proceeding to hear and determine the case over the objection
of the defendant.
The renewed Motion to Dismiss was supported by the
Affidavit of Clifford L. Ashton, one of the attorneys for
the defendant. The facts set forth in the Affidavit were
that the accident on account of which damages were claimed
by the plaintiff occurred in January, 1949, at Tabernash,
Colorado, some sixty-six miles from Denver, Colorado. That
the plaintiff was at all times a resident of Denver, Colorado. That the defendant is incorporated under the laws
of the State of Delaware, operates a line of railroad in
Colorado and Utah, and has its general offices and headquarters in Denver, where the major portion of its business is carried on. That it is qualified to do business in the
State of Utah. That the plaintiff's claim was predicated
upon a violation of the Safety Appliance Act. That both
federal and state courts are located in the City and County
of Denver, and are open and have jurisdiction to entertain
the plaintiff's present cause of action. That plaintiff's
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action could be heard and determined with reasonable
promptness in either of the state or federal courts in Denver. That in order to defend the plaintiff's claim, it would
be necessary to bring from Denver and nearby Golden,
Colorado, a number of witnesses, estimated to be eleven.
The distance which these witnesses would be required to
travel from Denver is 570 miles. The Affidavit sets forth
the names of the witnesses and the nature and character
of the testimony expcted to be given by them. Four of the
witnesses allegedly required by the defendant were physicians and surgeons residing in Denver, each of whom had
previously treated the plaintiff for various ailments or for
the injury sustained in the accident at Tabernash. The
name of one of these doctors has not been ascertained at the
time the Affidavit was made, but the nature of the testimony expected to be given by him was outlined. It was
further pointed out in the Affidavit that the doctors were
private practitioners, actively engaged in the practice of
their professions, and unwilling to leave their fields of
practice and come to Salt Lake City, except by meeting
their own terms of compensation and expense. It was also
pointed out that none of the witnesses could be compelled
by process to attend the trial in Salt Lake City, and that
the plaintiff could obtain their services as witnesses only
by meeting such terms as they saw fit to impose. A detailed estimate of the cost to the defendant of defend.ing the
plaintiff's claim in the District Court of Salt Lake County
was set forth in the Affidavit, as well as the difference in
the expense to the defendant in trying the plaintiff's case
in Denver and in Salt Lake City. The Affidavit also pointed
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out the desirability to the defendant of permitting the jury
to inspect the car from which the plaintiff claimed to have
been thrown by a defective brake. That the car was in the
defendant's yards at Denver, and it could not be brought to
Salt Lake City except at considerable expense and inconvenience to the defendant. Finally, it was asserted that
the trial of the case in the court where it was pending
would add to the congestion of the calendar of that court
and delay the trial of the cases involving local citizens and
local problems of pressing importance, and also that it imposed an unnecessary and unjust burden upon the taxpayers
of this State.
Mr. Wayne L. Black, one of plaintiff's attorneys, filed
on his behalf an Affidavit in opposition to the renewed
Motion to Dismiss, in which virtually all of the material
facts set forth in the defendant's Affidavit were denied.
The issues raised by the Affidavit were set down for hearing at which both parties appeared. At this hearing, the
defendant put in evidence consisting of the testimony of
Mr. Ashton, and a Certificate of the Clerk of the District
Court of the Second Judicial District, City and County of
Denver, State of Colorado. The plaintiff offered no evidence
whatever.
The Certificate of the clerk of the Colorado court introduced in evidence by the defendant recited that any case set
for trial at th-e time of his Certificate in either of two divisions of the court of which he was Clerk could readily be
tried within a period of three months if both sides diligently
pursued the case to trial. That in the other three divisions
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of his Court, under the circumstances above stated, cases
could be tried within a period of not to exceed four and
one-half months; that if the attorneys cooperated with the
court a case after being set for trial can be disposed of by
any one of the five divisions within a period of four and
one-half months after the case has been set. That cases
being filed can be put at issue within a period of two
months, if there is no unreasonable delay caused by either
party. The Certificate was dated December 11, 1950 (R.
33).
Mr. Ashton's testimony corroborated and established
each of the facts recited in his Affidavit. He broke down
the expense to the defendant of defending this action in
the court in which it is pending. He itemized the fees of
each witness which the defendant would be compelled to
pay in order to obtain his attendance at the trial in Salt
Lake City (R. 42-43). He based the estimates upon experience in other like cases, and pointed out the difficulties
and uncertainties incident to producing these witnesses in
Salt Lake City. Of course, none of them could be compelled
to come to Salt Lake City, and in no event would any of
the witnesses come here except upon such terms as each
of them might impose. Assuming that the trial could be
consummated in two days, Mr. Ashton computed the cost to
the defendant of defending this action here at $1615.44.
This item, however, did not cover the cost of transporting
the witnesses from Denver to Salt Lake City. He considered that expense to the defendant to try the case in Denver
would not exceed $350.00 (R. 44-5).
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It was stipulated between the parties that Mr. Robert
Olsen, who is a Deputy Clerk of Salt Lake County, would
testify if called as a witness that the present condition of
the calendar of the Third Judicial District was that on
April1, there were approximately 110 cases ready for trial,
and that on that day eighteen cases would be assigned to
each of the five Judges for trial.

On cross-examination Mr. Ashton admitted that he
did not know in what County the accident to plaintiff occurred, nor in which District Court that place might be
located, or what the condition of the calendar in such District Court then was. He also admitted that it had not been
necessary in the past for the defendant to produce any witness to testify to the earnings of a railroad employee in
any action against the defendant tried in the courts of
Utah, because the plaintiff in all cases in the past had
stipulated to a tabulation of such earnings prepared by
the defendant. He also admitted that under "the Labor
Management Agreement railroad employees were required
to attend court when requested by the management if they
are paid the amount which they would have earned at work
that day" (R. 53).
In determining the factors which should control the
discretion of the trial court to dismiss an action upon the
ground of forum non conveniens, this Court has in its opinion reversing the order of Judge Hendricks proceeded, we
respectfully submit, upon an erroneous theory of that doctrine. It is not true that the plaintiff has a right to bring
his action in this State. If he had any such right, obviously
the courts of this State could have no discretion to deny it.
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He gets into the courts of this State not by virtue of any
right but solely by comity. He is not a resident of this
State and contributes nothing to the heavy burden of maintaining our courts. That burden is borne solely by the
citidens of this State. He was not summoned into the courts
of this State. He was not injured here, nor do any of his
witnesses reside here, except one whom . he employed
long after the injury occurred. It is obvious, and the plaintiff undoubtedly would confess, that his sole reason for
invoking the jurisdiction of the courts of this State is that
he considers them one of the "soft spots" in our judicial
system. In such circumstances it is a perversion of the
doctrine of forum non conveniens to say that the plaintiff
has a right to come into the courts of this State, and that
his convenience is to be considered in determining whether
our courts should entertain his suit. The vital matter to be
considered when confronted with such an attempt to transport litigation is the convenience of the defendant, of the
witnesses and the expense to the taxpayers of this State.
This court in its opinion also st~tes that our courts
should reject imported litigation only in exceptional circumstances. But the principle of forum non conveniens
requires that the courts of a state entertain imported
litigation only in exceptional circumstances. Such litigation is necessarily a heavy inconvenience upon the
defendant and to litigants of the state who help to bear the
burden of maintaining the courts. This is not an isolated
case of migratory litigation. As the records of this Court
will disclose, it is a car in a long train of transported
lawsuits. Such litigation thrives upon the indifference of
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our courts to the rights of the taxpayers of this State and
to the rights of local citizens. A proper application of the
doctrine of forum non conveniens requires the rejection of
all cases that are prosecuted here, solely because the plaintiff considers that the machinery of our courts has been
geared to afford him greater relief than he can obtain in
the courts of his own state.
The evidence submitted by the defendant in support
of its motion to dismiss was not in any manner contradicted,
impeached, or impaired. It established that the defendant
was required to incur great expense to defend the action
in this State. It established that the defendant could not
require the attendance of any of the witnesses necessary to
establish its defense. It was compelled to rely upon their
depositions, or meet any terms that they might impose as
a condition to their attendance at the trial here. It established that the defendant could not foresee the disadvantages and the difficulties it would be confronted with
in defending the action far from the scene of the accident
and the residence of the witnesses. A striking illustration
of such disadvantage actually occurred. The original complaint was founded solely upon an alleged violation by the
defendant of the Safety Appliance Act. On the opening of
the trial, the plaintiff was permitted to file an amendment
to the complaint. In this amendment he set up a completely
new theory of liability. He claimed that his accident and
injury was caused by a violation of the Federal Employers'
Liability Act. Had the defendant been confronted with
such a situation in the courts of the state where the ac-
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cident occurred and where all of the witnesses resided, it
could have investigated the facts on the ground and summoned the additional witnesses necessary to meet it. Being
confronted with the situation here, defendant was forced
to rely upon the weaknesses of the plaintiff's testimony.
Such situations are, of course, common in litigation, and
the fact that they arise is a compelling reason why the
courts of this State should not entertain this type of litigation.
The plaintiff submitted no evidence in opposition to
the defendant's motion, although he put in issue substantially all of the grounds alleged by the defendant in support
of the motion. The trial court made no findings of fact
nor conclusions of law on these contested issues, and there
is no basis whatever in the evidence to support the ruling
complained of.
We respectfully submit that the court abused its discretion in denying the defendant's motion to dismiss.
CONCLUSION
In summary, appellant contends that there was no
evidence to prove that it was negligent in failing to remove
from the floor of the Jordan Spreader car "tools, chains,
or other objects," or that its failure to do so caused in whole
or in part the accident and injuries of which the plaintiff
complains; that the evidence without conflict disclosed that
the plaintiff fell from the car because of the action of the
brake staff following the disengaging of the pawl from
the ratchet, and for these reasons the trial court committed prejudicial error in permitting the jury to base
a verdict against the defendant upon a ground of Jia.;.
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bility unsupported by any evidence; that there was ample
evidence to support a finding by the jury that the sole
cause of the a~cident and injury sustained by the plaintiff
was his failure to make use of the brake club in releasing
the brake as he had been instructed to do by his superior
officer and as ordinary care would dictate, and for these
reasons the court committed prejudicial error in refusing to
submit this issue to the jury for its determination as requested by the defendant; that the Federal Employers'
Liability Act does not make the defendant an insurer of the
safety of its employees, that liability under that Act is
predicated upon negligence, that such negligence is not
established by the fact that the employee may have been
injured in the course of his employment, that the burden
rested upon the plaintiff to prove that the defendant was
negligent and that such negligence caused in whole or in
part the accident and injury of which the plaintiff complains, and the court committed prejudicial error in refusing to apply these propositions of law to the evidence in
this case as requested by the defendant; and finally that the
trial court erred in refusing to dismiss the action upon the
ground of forum non conveniens. Because of each. and all
of the foregoing errors of the trial court, the judgment
appealed from should be reversed.
1

Respectfully submitted,
VAN COTT, BAGLEY,
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Defendant and Appellant.
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